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INTRODUCTION
It is well known that acquirers of publicly held corporations usu-
ally pay substantial premiums relative to the pre-acquisition market
prices of the acquired corporations' shares.' Legal scholars have ex-
amined a variety of explanations for this phenomenon, ranging from
S • 2
merger gain sharing to inefficient behavioral motivations. Largely
absent from these explanations, however, is any effort to differentiate
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Sands provided valuable research assistance, and Daniel S. Hamermesh of the Univer-
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The data summarized in Appendix A to this Article reflect the continuing perva-
siveness of acquisition premiums in mergers and acquisitions. See also Gregor Andrade
et al., New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 106 tbl.1 (2001)
(stating that the median premium for deals in which both target and acquirer were
publicly traded, U.S.-based firms was 37.9% from 1973-1998).
2 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REv. 597,
624-26 (1989) (describing two reasons why overpayment occurs: managers may be ha-
bitually over-optimistic about the target's true value, and they may be ignorant about
bidding theory); John C. Coates IV, "Fair Value" as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law:
Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1273-77 (1999)
(identifying three sources of control premiums: synergy value, expropriation value,
and pure control value); Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications
of "Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 891, 897-98
(1988) (characterizing two distinct explanations for discounts between securities prices
and underlying corporate asset values: the misinvestment hypothesis (investors expect
corporate managers to misinvest assets) and the market hypothesis (securities prices
are discounted because of endogenous noise created by trading and valuation prac-
tices)); Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value,
and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1244-52 (1990) (distinguishing a model of het-
erogeneous beliefs positing that investors value stock differently from the traditional
homogeneous view captured in the capital asset pricing model, in which investors view
stocks as perfect substitutes for one another).
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between premiums paid in transactions in which the "acquirer" pur-
chases the shares of the "target" or "selling"s firm for cash, and trans-
actions in which the "target's" shares are converted into shares of the
"acquirer., 4 The two types of transactions actually are quite distinct.
Elaboration upon the distinction raises concerns about the coherence
of the Delaware case law which addresses the standards governing ju-
dicial review of the conduct of the target's directors. Consideration of
such questions in Part I of this Article leads to my suggestion that the
Delaware case law could be rationalized by abandoning the change of
control litmus test for enhancing both director duties and judicial
scrutiny of director conduct. Delaware law should focus instead on
the extent to which unilateral director action in approving mergers
impairs the ability of shareholders to approve or disapprove such
transactions.
Part II of this Article briefly reviews some of the explanations for
the payment of merger premiums and questions the cogency of some
of those explanations in light of recent merger data. In particular, the
merger gain-sharing explanation appears problematic in light of evi-
dence that premiums in cash and stock-for-stock mergers are nearly
identical in magnitude. On the other hand, the data indicate that the
existence of acquirer shareholder voting rights significantly (and
negatively) affects premium size, reinforcing judicial views about the
importance of such rights.
Part III examines whether modification of Delaware doctrine con-
cerning the fiduciary obligations of directors in connection with their
approval of mergers is necessary so that it more closely matches the
level of intensity of judicial review with both the magnitude of the
threat to shareholder interests and the likelihood of unchecked direc-
tor misbehavior. In particular, Part III suggests that (1) a change of
control in a merger should at most be one of several factors, rather
than wholly conclusive, in the court's decision whether to apply
3 The terms "acquirer," "target," and "seller" are functionally ambiguous and often
interchangeable, as will be explored later in this Article. See infra note 9 (demonstrat-
ing the functional equivalence between alternative deal structures).
But seeAndrade et al., supra note 1, at 112 (noting significant inferiority of post-
merger returns to acquiring firm shareholders where the acquisition is financed with
common stock of the acquirer); SARA B. MOELLER ET AL., Do SHAREHOLDERS OF
ACQUIRING FIRMS GAIN FROM AcQuISITIONS? 32 tbl.4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 9523, 2003) (providing merger announcement abnormal return
data for deals with private, public, and subsidiary targets), available at http://www.
nber.org/papers/w9523.
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"enhanced scrutiny""' in reviewing a transaction; and (2) the actions of
disinterested and independent directors in relation to mergers war-
rant enhanced judicial scrutiny only when they unilaterally and sig-
nificantly impair shareholder voting rights. Finally, the Article sug-
gests that the similarity between the positions of acquiring firm
shareholders and target firm shareholders justifies more similar legis-
lative and judicial treatment of both groups in mergers.
I. EVALUATING MERGER GAINS AND OTHER EXPLANATIONS OF
PREMIUMS IN LIGHT OF RECENT MERGER DATA
A. Traditional Gain-Sharing Explanations of Merger Premiums and Their
Application in Cash Versus Stock-for-Stock Acquisitions
Although there are competing views about which explanations
most effectively account for the phenomenon of merger and acquisi-
tion premiums, traditional explanations posit that acquiring firms jus-
tify payment of such premiums based on gains attributable to the
merger in the form of synergies or improved management. 6 In the
case of an acquisition for cash, such traditional explanations offer the
comforting appearance of fairness to both the target and acquiring
firm's shareholders. Payment of a premium to the target corporation's
shareholders is a vehicle for sharing merger gains with target share-
holders, who, as a result of the cash-out merger, would have no fur-
ther equity claim to such gains, and therefore would not otherwise
share in them.
5 "Enhanced scrutiny" is the Delaware Supreme Court's term for a form ofjudicial
review in which, to sustain the transaction they have approved, directors must come
forward with evidence of the subjective reasonableness of their basis for acting and the
objective reasonableness of their action in light of the advantage to be achieved or the
threat to be avoided. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.
1985) (requiring that the directors "show that they had reasonable grounds for believ-
ing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because of another per-
son's stock ownership" and that they show the measure adopted is "reasonable in rela-
tion to the threat posed" before they are accorded the protection of the business
judgment rule); see also Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 935
(Del. 2003) (applying Unocal and its progeny to conclude that deal protection devices
adopted by the board of the target corporation were impermissibly "preclusive and co-
ercive"); Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del.
1994) (drawing upon standards of judicial review developed and applied to defensive
measures in Unocal and to bidding deterrents in Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan,
Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287-88 (Del. 1989)).
6 See Kraakman, supra note 2, at 893-95 (describing "traditional accounts of mo-
tives and gains in the acquisitions literature").
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The case of a stock-for-stock merger, however, is starkly different.
In such a transaction, shareholders of both constituent corporations
remain shareholders in the continuing combined enterprise. Thus,
both groups-acquirer shareholders and target shareholders-are
able to participate pro rata in gains arising out of the merger. There-
fore, a premium to the target's shareholders cannot be justified, as in
a cash acquisition, on the premise that it is the only way to permit
7those shareholders to share in the gains arising from the merger.
Indeed, from a mechanical standpoint, it is somewhat arbitrary to
characterize either corporation in a stock-for-stock merger as an "ac-
quirer" or a "target." From the shareholders' standpoint, such a
merger could be structured to provide that either corporation's shares
be issued in the transaction. While we ordinarily see stock-for-stock
mergers choreographed so that the smaller firm (measured by in-
come, revenue, or aggregate market capitalization) merges into the
larger firm (or with its wholly-owned subsidiary), it is just as possible
for the minnow to swallow the whale. On occasion, stock-for-stock
mergers are structured just that way, where the larger firm merges
into the smaller firm (or its subsidiary), and the smaller firm issues
shares in the merger.8 From the shareholders' standpoint, it should
not matter who swallows whom in terms of formal corporate structure
or which corporation's shares are issued in the merger; the sole issue
of concern is their proportional ownership of the combined firm. '
7 On the other hand, a premium for target shareholders in a stock-for-stock
merger may reflect a wealth transfer from acquirer shareholders to target sharehold-
ers, just as such transfers may occur in cash acquisitions.
For example, accounts of the May 2000 merger of Tuboscope Inc. and Varco In-
ternational, Inc. identify Tuboscope as the acquirer (presumably because Tuboscope
was the surviving corporation in the merger), yet Tuboscope's aggregate market capi-
talization was only eighty percent of Varco's, and Tuboscope's revenues were less than
two-thirds of Varco's. See Quality Servs. Co., Weekly Corporate Growth Report, 2000
WL 9522790 (April 3, 2000) (noting that Tuboscope was the acquirer); Tuboscope
Inc., Form S-4/A 8-9 (Apr. 25, 2000) (stating that for fiscal year 1999 Tuboscope had
revenues of approximately $385 million while Varco's revenues were approximately
$593 million), http://www.sec.gov. Despite the difference in value, the merging com-
panies described the transaction as a "merger of equals." Id. at Annex I, Agreement
and Plan of Merger.
9 For example, suppose Whale Co., with 95 million shares outstanding trading at
$20 per share ($1.9 billion aggregate market capitalization), was to merge with Min-
now Co., with only 10 million shares outstanding trading at $10 per share ($100 mil-
lion aggregate market capitalization). Each Minnow Co. share was converted in the
merger into 0.5 shares of Whale Co. and Minnow Co. merged either into Whale Co. or
with a wholly-owned acquisition subsidiary of Whale Co. While such a structure is
quite common, where a smaller corporation merges with a much larger corporation
(or its subsidiary), the transaction could easily be inverted and yet still achieve the
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In either case, it is not immediately apparent why either of the
combining firms' shares should be issued in the merger at a ratio that
confers upon either of their respective shareholders a premium
(measured by the market value of the shares to be received relative to
the market price of the shares to be converted in the merger). If both
groups of shareholders end up with a proportionate share of the con-
tinuing enterprise that reflects the pre-transaction ratio of their cor-
poration's market value, one could conclude that, on average, they
would share fairly in the value of the combined entity and in the value
of merger gains. Of course, it is not asserted that, in each individual
case, the ratio of merging corporations' pre-announcement stock
prices determines a "correct" economic evaluation of the corpora-
tions' relative contributions to the combined entity or to the gains re-
sulting from the merger. One firm's shares, for example, may be
traded less actively, may be affected by the presence of a controlling
shareholder, or may trade at a discount relative to the other firm's
shares for some other reason. Perhaps acquirers (corporations whose
shares are issued in stock-for-stock mergers) consistently pay a pre-
mium because the share prices of target firms are consistently under-
valued. While all these reasons might be plausible, however, there is
no systematic reason why either merger constituent should pay such a
premium solely to allow the other constituent's shareholders to par-
ticipate in merger gains.
Thus, if merger gain sharing were a valid explanation for the
payment of merger premiums, one would expect to find that premi-
ums in cash acquisitions consistently, and significantly, exceed premi-
ums paid in pure stock-for-stock transactions. Indeed, if gain sharing
were the only explanation for merger premiums, on average one
would expect to find premiums in cash acquisitions, but not at all in
stock-for-stock deals.
same economic result from the shareholders' standpoint. Consider the inverted
merger in which each of Whale Co.'s 95 million shares is converted into two shares of
Minnow Co., with Whale Co. merging into Minnow Co. or with a wholly-owned acquisi-
tion subsidiary of Minnow Co. In either merger structure, the Whale Co. and Minnow
Co. shareholders' proportionate interests in the continuing entity are the same, with
95% of the ongoing corporation's shares owned by the original Whale Co. sharehold-
ers, and the remaining 5% owned by the original Minnow Co. shareholders. Presuma-
bly the shareholders of both Whale Co. and Minnow Co. would be indifferent as to the
choice between these two alternative structures. In each structure, the Whale and
Minnow shareholders have the same proportional ownership of the combined firm
(95% for Whale, 5% for Minnow) as the firms' pre-merger ratio of aggregate market
capitalization.
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B. Evaluating Gain Sharing and Alternative Explanations in Light of
Merger Premium Evidence
The reality, however, is that premiums are paid, routinely, in stock-
for-stock mergers by the corporation (almost always the one dubbed
the "acquirer") that issues shares in connection with the merger. Data
from stock-for-stock mergers in 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 reveal a
mean premium of approximately 30%, as compared to a mean pre-
mium of approximately 36% paid in cash acquisitions.'0 The median
premium observed in stock-for-stock transactions in these years
(28.26%) was essentially identical to the median observed in all-cash
acquisitions (28.07%)."
One must be modest about the significance of these data. They
are preliminary and limited, both in sample size and in chronological
coverage. Their reflection of a near identical premium size in both
cash and stock acquisitions, however, must be at least unsettling to
those who would explain premium payments on the basis of merger
gain sharing.
If merger gain sharing is unconvincing as an explanation for the
payment of premiums in stock-for-stock mergers, what alternative ex-
planations are available? One frequently invoked alternative is the
theory that acquiring firms' managers consistently cause their firms to
overpay in acquisitions in order to satisfy personal interests, namely,
greater compensation and more extensive managerial authority.
12
This acquirer empire-building theory suggests that factors having no
apparent economic justification from the standpoint of the acquiring
firm's shareholders contribute significantly to the existence and size
of the premium. If supported by the data, this suggestion might
Infra Appendix A tbl.1.
Id. This near equivalence is all the more striking given the difference in tax
treatment between cash and stock mergers. Cash acquisitions generally create taxable
gain for target shareholders, while stock-for-stock mergers generally do not. See, e.g.,
SAMUEL C. THOMPSON, JR., TAXABLE AND TAX-FREE CORPORATE MERGERS, AcQUI-
SITIONS AND LBO's 3 (1994) (summarizing how the consideration paid in taxable ac-
quisitions generally consists of cash or debt instruments while acquisitions paid for
with a substantial portion of stock by the acquiring corporation may qualify as a tax-
free acquisitive reorganization). As a result of this difference in tax treatment, one
might expect to see premiums in cash acquisitions to be considerably higher than
premiums in stock-for-stock mergers in order to compensate target shareholders for
the relatively adverse tax consequences of a cash acquisition.
12 See, e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 627 (explaining bidder overpayment in part be-
cause "[i]ncentives to increase size include managers' desire for greater prestige and
visibility, the desire of the chief executive officer to leave a legacy and not be a mere
caretaker, and compensation structures that reward growth in sales and profits").
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explain and corroborate the analyses that question both the economic
wisdom of mergers from the standpoint of the acquiring corporation's
shareholders and the adequacy of legal checks on actions of the ac-
quiring corporation's directors.1 3 Even more encouraging, the theory
could explain why premiums paid in mergers are virtually identical
regardless of whether the acquisition currency is cash or stock-since
there is no apparent reason why the extent and effect of rent seeking
by acquirer managers should differ as between those two types of
mergers.
A possible empirical test of this suggestion, however, did not sup-
port the idea. The potency of private managerial interests might be
measured by the extent to which acquiring firm directors agree to
share postmerger control with directors or officers of the target firm.
It is at least plausible that the private interests of acquiring firm man-
agers would be attenuated-and premiums would be lower where
acquiring firm directors cede substantial postmerger board represen-
tation to target directors and officers. In the stock-for-stock merger
data we studied, however, the percentage of postmerger directors who
had been directors or officers of the target had essentially no effect
on the premium size. 14 On the other hand, a number of recent stud-
ies indicate that favorable treatment of target CEOs corresponds to
reduced merger premiums,'5 thus demonstrating that negotiating
13 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical As-
sessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1269-
72 (1984) (discussing the potential requirement that the bidder obtain shareholder
approval for acquisitions); James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in Action: A Study of Psycho-
logical Factors in Merger Decision-Making, 62 OHIO ST. LJ. 1333, 1401 (2001) (concluding
that there is a relationship between psychological factors in merger decision making
and the decrease in value for shareholders as a result of these transactions, and that
both corporate and securities law fail to acknowledge these psychological factors). But
Cf. MOELLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 18-19, 23 (reviewing evidence that negative returns
to acquirers in stock-for-stock mergers may be due to signaling effects in which the
stock issuance indicates that the firm has "exhausted internal growth opportunities, so
that firm value drops as a result of that signal rather than because of the acquisition").
14 Infra Appendix A tbl.2 (demonstrating the effects of target director representa-
tion in the surviving corporation on the size of premiums in stock-for-stock mergers).
15 See jay C. Hartzell et al., What's In It For Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired, REV.
FIN. STUD. (forthcoming) (presenting regression estimates that provide some evidence
indicating that "target CEOs negotiate lower acquisition premia for their own share-
holders in transactions that involve extraordinary personal treatment of the CEO");
Julie Wulf, Do CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from "Mergers of Equals,"
20J.L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming Spring 2004) ("The evidence suggests that [target]
CEOs trade power for premium by negotiating shared control in the merged firm in
exchange for lower [target] shareholder premiums."), available at http://www.
management.wharton.upenn.edu/wulfresearch/Papers/MOEMarch_03.pdf.
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incentives for target management, rather than for bidder manage-
ment, may be an explanation of merger premiums.
A variant of the acquirer empire-building theory might explain
merger premiums somewhat less cynically, but perhaps more effec-
tively. Where the acquirer is much larger (as measured by revenues,
for example) than the target firm, the exchange ratio in a stock-for-
stock merger has a much lesser economic significance to sharehold-
ers, representatives, and managers of the acquirer. Therefore, ac-
quirer representatives might tend to agree to relatively greater merger
premiums than those found in mergers among firms of more equal
size. What is a few more shares out of the millions already outstand-
ing? Interestingly, however, in our data, the relationship between the
size of merger premium and the relative size of merging firms (meas-
ured by the ratio of acquirer revenues to target revenues) was nega-
tive.16 In mergers in which the acquiring firm's revenues were over
five times those of the target, merger premiums were a statistically sig-
nificant 11.65% below premiums observed in mergers between compa-
nies closer in size. 17 If this pattern were to be confirmed by more
thorough empirical analysis, some alternative explanation for the sig-
nificance of relative firm size would be needed.
We considered one other factor potentially influencing merger
premium size-whether the favorable vote of the acquiring firm's
shareholders was required."' The intuitive appeal of this factor is the
notion that, if approval by the acquiring firm's shareholder were re-
quired, the size of the premium the acquiring firm might be willing to
pay will be less, so as to help ensure acquiring firm shareholder ap-
proval. Conversely, this constraint on the merger premium would be
absent if no such approval were needed. This intuition is supported
by the merger data, albeit subject to the general limitations noted ear-
lier. More specifically, the data indicate that, other things being
equal, the existence of acquiring firm shareholder voting rights re-
duces the merger premium by 18.65%.19
l6 Infra Appendix A tbl.2.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Infra Appendix A tbl.2. This evidence is not inconsistent with the suggestion
that "control, without more, has limited value." Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman,
Delaware's Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 521,
536 n.33 (2002) (citing a study comparing the values of voting and nonvoting shares in
the same firms and explaining the low premium accorded to voting shares). Perhaps
that inconsistency is resolved by the fact that the economic significance of collective
voting control, however insignificant it might appear in the abstract, is abnormally
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These tentative empirical observations suggest some questions
about, and possible refinements to, the Delaware case law on the fidu-
ciary duties of the directors of merging firms, as discussed below.
II. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES FOR DELAWARE CASE LAW ON
FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DIRECTORS
OF MERGING CORPORATIONS
The pervasive phenomenon of premiums in stock-for-stock merg-
ers, and their near equivalence to premiums paid in cash acquisitions,
challenges significant elements of established corporate law in the
area of mergers and acquisitions-most notably in the area ofjudicial
scrutiny of the conduct of directors. Appreciating the significance of
these challenges requires a brief review of some of those legal ele-
ments.
The Delaware Supreme Court established two key propositions of
20law in 1994 in Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. and
Arnold v. Society for Savings:21 (1) In a transaction (notably a merger)
in which control of a corporation is acquired by a single person or
group, the directors of the corporation are obliged to obtain the
highest current value reasonably available. Their efforts in approving
such a transaction are subject to "enhanced scrutiny" by the courts be-
cause the stockholders are losing the opportunity to obtain a control
premium in the future.2 (2) In a transaction (notably a merger) in
which control remains in a fluid, disaggregated body of stockholders,
the directors have no such obligation to achieve the highest currently
available value. Their actions in approving such a transaction (putting
aside majority conflict of interest, defensive measures, and/or deal
protection devices) are not subject to enhanced judicial scrutiny.
23
This doctrinal dichotomy, reaffirmed this year by the Delaware
24Supreme Court, is appealing in several respects. First, the aspect
of the QVC doctrine-insisting upon the realization of the highest
current value available when corporate control is acquired for
high precisely where it emerges in a concrete context-as a prerequisite to the accom-
plishment of a transaction such as an impending merger.
20 QVC, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
21 Arnold, 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994).
22 QVC, 637 A.2d at 43, 45.
23 Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1289-90.
24 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927-31 (Del. 2003)
(holding that the standard of review to be applied to a decision by a board of directors
depends on whether the merger transaction creates a change in control).
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cash-flows logically from traditional merger gain-sharing explana-
tions of premiums. Under those explanations, it makes inherent
25sense-and Delaware case law requires -that fiduciaries for target
shareholders can, and should, bargain for payment of a premium in a
cash acquisition. Therefore, the target shareholders can, to some ex-
tent, share in merger gains, along with the acquirer's shareholders,
who will enjoy the equity interest in the postmerger enterprise. Sec-
ond, QVC's application of current value-maximization duties, even in
stock-for-stock mergers, where postmerger control will be concen-
trated in the hands of a single shareholder or shareholder group, use-
fully responds to the empirical observation noted above that collec-
tive, but disaggregated, shareholder voting power has considerable
value. Thus, shareholder voting power deserves both protection by
26directors and compensation in the form of a premium.
Third, while there are some complexities at the margin,27 the doc
trinal dichotomy established in the Delaware case law is relatively easy
to apply. It affords the courts a means to review at least some catego-
ries of transactions having enormous importance to shareholders. It
also allows the courts to defer to the good faith decisions of disinter-
ested directors in transactions (such as most stock-for-stock mergers)
in which the target firm's shareholders will in the aggregate retain
control of the enterprise and, in any event, will have a controlling vote
on whether the transaction goes forward.
25 See QVC, 637 A.2d at 44 ("In the sale of control context, the directors must focus
on one primary objective-to secure the transaction offering the best value reasonably
available for the stockholders-and they must exercise their fiduciary duties to further
that end."); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986) (discussing the board's responsibility of maximization of the company's
value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873
(Del. 1985) ("In the specific context of a proposed merger of domestic corporations, a
director has a duty... to act in an informed and deliberate manner in determining
whether to approve an agreement of merger before submitting the proposal to the
stockholders.").
26 QVC, 637 A.2d at 4243; see supra note 19 (discussing the economic significance
of collective voting control in the context of a merger).
27 See In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S'holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 70-71 (Del. 1995)
(holding that a transaction in which thirty-three percent of the company's shares were
acquired for cash was not subject to Revlon duties-the duties of a board of directors,
once they have decided to sell control of the company, to gain the best available price
for the shareholders of that company); cf In re Lukens Inc. S'holders Litig., 757 A.2d
720, 732 n.25 (Del. Ch. 1999) (suggesting that a merger in which consideration con-
sisted of sixty-two percent cash and thirty-eight percent stock of the acquirer would
likely be subject to Revlon duties).
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Finally, it has also been suggested that the dichotomy usefully
identifies when directors of the seller are obliged to seek and obtain
maximum current value, as opposed to being permitted a wider range
ofjudgment about longer-term strategic considerations.28
For a number of reasons described below, however, there are un-
satisfying aspects of the doctrinal emphasis on a distinction between
mergers in which corporate control is transferred and those in which
it is not.29 As described below, the Delaware doctrine could have de-
veloped-and could still develop-in a different way, one that might
more accurately account for the legislative facts ° that inform the de-
velopment of the doctrine and continue to put pressure on it. What
follows, then, is an effort to articulate a doctrinal framework for direc-
tor duties in mergers that 1) rejects a rigid application of the control-
shifting test originally articulated in QVC, and 2) substitutes guides for
judicial review and director conduct that more accurately address
competing interests in mergers. Inspiring this effort is the wise coun-
sel that, "because standards of review serve important policy functions,
to formulate or apply those standards without being sufficiently mind-
ful of those functions, risks creating unintended distortions of incen-
tives to the detriment of stockholders."31
A. The (Un)importance of Change in Control in Establishing
Director Duties and Standards ofJudicial Review
As previously noted, QVC correctly recognized that disaggregated
collective voting power over fundamental corporate changes has sub-
stantial value and that shareholders should not be deprived of that
28 See Leo E. Stnine, Jr., Categorical Confusion: Deal Protection Measures in Stock-for-
Stock Merger Agreements, 56 Bus. LAW. 919, 931 (2001) (explaining that the QVC change
of control test highlights when corporate directors are obliged to work for the greatest
immediate value).
29 This is not the first expression of dissatisfaction with this doctrinal dichotomy.
See Black & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 534-37 (arguing against the disparate treat-
ment of change of control transactions). In fact, Black and Kraakman, as well as Mar-
cel Kahan, have previously addressed many of the points made in this Article with re-
spect to the law of mergers and acquisitions. Id. at 534-36, 544, 546-47; Marcel Kahan,
Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court's Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP.
L. 583,593-99 (1994). Appendix B compares the recommendations in this Article with
those in the articles by Black & Kraakman and Kahan. Infra Appendix B.
30 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of
Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 503 (2002) (describing the role of "legislative
facts" in guiding the development of corporate common law).
31 William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in
Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAw. 1287, 1297 (2001).
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S32
value without compensation. It is thus difficult to quarrel with the
court's observation that "[o]nce control has shifted, the current...
stockholders will have no leverage in the future to demand another
control premium. As a result, [they should receive] a control pre-
mium and/or protective devices of significant value."33 QVC also cor-
rectly concluded that the loss of such collective voting power in an ac-
quisition of corporate control may be significant in establishing the
substantive fiduciary obligations of target directors and the way in
which courts should evaluate their conduct in light of those obliga-
tions.
It is quite another thing, however, to posit that the transfer of
corporate control invariably triggers a duty to achieve maximum cur-
rent value and requires enhanced judicial scrutiny, while the absence
of such a transfer of control invariably does neither.3 5 The question-
able aspect of QVC is its holding that the passage of control and the
concomitant loss of voting power always mandate enhanced judicial
scrutiny. 6
The Delaware Supreme Court, moreover, has established an
equally questionable premise with respect to mergers which do not in-
volve a change of control. In Arnold, the Delaware Supreme Court
reasoned that in such non-change of control mergers the "plaintiffs
opportunity to receive a control premium is not foreclosed. Thus,
plaintiff's claim that enhanced scrutiny is required under the circum-
",37stances of this case lacks merit .... In other words, as long as con-
trol does not pass in a merger, enhanced scrutiny is not required and
the directors' approval of the transaction is entitled to judicial defer-
ence under the business judgment rule.
This bifurcated approach to judicial review is subject to critique
on both sides. First, it must surely be an overstatement that all
32 Supra text accompanying note 26.
33 Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del.
1994). The only disputable point is the extent of such value. See Black & Kraakman,
supra note 19, at 522-23 (outlining the hidden value model of the stock market).
34 637 A.2d at 43-44.
35 Vice Chancellor Strine similarly questioned the bifurcated structure of Delaware
merger doctrine. His work suggests that judicial deference may be appropriate with
regard to the directors' decision to approve a stock-for-stock merger, but that such
deference may not be equally appropriate for deal protection devices associated with
that merger. See Strine, supra note 28, at 931 (arguing that the use of the QVC test in
this manner lacks judicial precedent and produces "odd" results).
36 637 A.2d at 45 (explaining why enhanced judicial scrutiny is necessary in
chan e of control transactions).
Arnold v. Soc'y for Say., 650 A.2d 1270,1290 (Del. 1994).
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mergers involving a change of control should be subjected to en-
hanced judicial scrutiny. Although these transactions are undeniably
important to shareholder interests, their formal legal prerequisites al-
ready protect shareholder interests (at least "target" firm shareholder
interests) to a relatively unusual extent: not only must the full board
of directors approve the transaction, but so too must the holders of a
majority of the outstanding shares of stock.38 Thus, there are legiti-
mate questions as to why a plaintiff stockholder should be entitled to
insist upon enhanced judicial scrutiny of a cash acquisition involving a
change of control when the transaction is the product of disinterested
and independent director approval and cannot take place without the
approval of a majority of the outstanding voting shares, voting in an
uncoerced setting.39 Such a context, with unfettered approval by both
disinterested, independent directors and disinterested shareholders
would seemingly eliminate any suspicion of the conduct of the direc-
tors or, at least, would restore the level ofjudicial deference associated
with the business judgment rule.40 A more intrusive level of judicial
involvement undervalues the significance of the shareholder franchise
and the ability of shareholders to make effective voting choices as to
issues affecting their financial interests-even a decision to approve a
merger in which they collectively cede their aggregate control of the
41
corporation.
38 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (b)-(c) (2001) (requiring board and share-
holder approval for merger agreements); infra text accompanying notes 100-05 (dis-
cussing the anomaly of requiring enhanced judicial scrutiny in the situation of a
change of control approved by disinterested directors and shareholders, while afford-
ing no such scrutiny to the actions of the directors of the acquirer in approving an ac-
quisition-a matter on which the acquirer shareholders generally have no voting right
at all, at least in a cash acquisition).
39 See Kahan, supra note 29, at 596 (questioning why Revlon duties or enhanced
judicial scrutiny need exist at all where shareholders have an uncoerced voting choice
and can reject a board-approved merger without cost); Paul L. Regan, The Unimportance
of Being Earnest: Paramount Rewrites the Rules for Enhanced Scrutiny in Corporate Takeovers,
46 HASTINGS L.J. 125, 129 (1994) ("[T]he undisputed significance of a change-of-
control transaction is, without more, an insufficient doctrinal basis to displace the def-
erence otherwise accorded to decisions made in good faith by informed and disinter-
ested directors, even in the context of a corporate takeover.").
40 Delaware case law has long established that "where a majority of fully informed
stockholders ratify action of even interested directors, an attack on the ratified transac-
tion normally must fail." Gerlach v. Gillam, 139 A.2d 591, 593 (Del. Ch. 1958); see also
Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 59 (Del. 1952) (explaining that a "new
set of rules" is invoked when a majority of independent and fully informed stockhold-
ers gves its approval).
See Allen et al., supra note 31, at 1308-09 (arguing in favor of applying the busi-
ness judgment rule to "self-interested mergers that are approved by either an effective
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In contrast, when evaluating mergers in which control does not
pass, it is equally unclear why the shareholder interests at stake do not
justify judicial review more searching than that afforded under the
business judgment rule, at least on some occasions. Since (as ob-
served above) premiums paid in mergers that do not shift control are
routinely equivalent in size to those in mergers that do shift control,
42
why should such premiums not be as important a doctrinal considera-
tion as the premiums paid when control changes? Should they not
have similar legal consequences?
The answer that QVC seems to supply is that target firm share-
holders in stock-for-stock mergers may receive shares that can elicit a
control premium in the future, but shareholders receiving cash for
their shares in a control sale do not. This answer, however, overlooks
the possibility that shareholders receiving cash for their shares in a
control-shifting merger can achieve essentially the same position ob-
tained through a stock-for-stock merger. They can do this by simply
taking their cash and investing it in other public company shares that
still retain the potential to elicit a control premium in the future.
QVC's answer also overlooks the point that shareholders who become
minority shareholders following a merger (as in QVC itself) do not in-
evitably and irrevocably lose the opportunity to obtain a premium for
their shares. There are numerous instances, some documented in
Delaware case law itself, in which companies with a controlling stock-
holder are sold, and both controlling and minority stockholders re-
ceive the same premium for their shares. In short, the loss of a future
premium seems to be neither a terribly dramatic consequence nor an
inevitability, even after a stock-for-stock merger in which control
passes.
On the other hand, stock-for-stock exchange ratios that are dis-
proportionately weighted to one side's shareholders transfer wealth
from one set to the other and threaten at least as much potential
independent director committee or by a majority of the minority stockholder vote");
see also Black & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 560 ("[A] shareholder voting decision, to
endorse or veto the target board's decision, is far better than unfettered board discre-
tion, and can usually block a truly bad board decision.").
42 See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
4 See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 918 (Del. 2003)
(reviewing a bidding war involving competing cash and stock bids with identical terms
for both Class A and Class B common stock, where two directors owned a majority of
the voting power through their ownership of the high-vote Class B stock); McMullin v.
Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 915-16 (Del. 2000) (discussing the sale of a majority-owned sub-
sidiary in which all shares received the same purchase price).
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harm to target shareholder economic interests as the loss of the po-
tential future realization of a premium in the target firm's shares.44
What comfort is it to shareholders to receive publicly traded shares of
the acquiring corporation, having a value greater than the pre-existing
market price of their shares, where the directors have squandered an
opportunity to obtain a substantially greater premium? In other
words, the problem that QVC identifies may not really be the loss of
an opportunity to obtain a premium in the future, but rather the fail-
ure to achieve the maximum premium available for the shares at the
time of the merger itself.
If the real driving force of QVC's doctrine is the lost (or insuffi-
ciently exploited) opportunity to obtain a premium that arises when a
sale of control occurs, rather than the supposed loss of an opportunity
to obtain a premium in the future, it is unclear why legal doctrine
must deal in a starkly different, even opposite way, with the potential
for a lost or insufficiently exploited opportunity to obtain the kind of
premium commonly paid in a stock-for-stock merger in which control
does not pass. This is not to argue, of course, either that director ac-
tion in all mergers must be subjected to enhanced judicial scrutiny, or
that all mergers impose a duty upon directors to obtain the highest
current value available for the stockholders. 4 6 The point here is simply
44 See Strine, supra note 28, at 930 (discussing problems associated with unfair ex-
change ratios); see also Black & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 536 (discussing the parallel
potential problems in both a sale of control and a stock-for-stock merger).
45 Perhaps the change of control aspect of QVC was, ultimately, not terribly impor-
tant. Consider, for example, how the court might have reacted if the Para-
mount/Viacom merger agreement had not been shored up by deal protection meas-
ures at all. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 49-
50 (Del. 1994) (discussing the prominent role played by the defensive measures of
Paramount's board in the court's conclusion that the directors' actions were "not rea-
sonable"). In that circumstance, the Paramount stockholders would have had the un-
fettered ability to vote the deal up or down in relatively short order. See id. at 42-43
(implying that public shareholders owned the majority of Paramount's voting shares,
and that, absent the protective measures imposed by the board, the shareholders could
have voted against the deal). Would the court really have brought enhanced scrutiny
to bear upon a transaction that the stockholders were quite free to approve or prevent,
even if it would have resulted in a change of control? Perhaps the court in QVC, rather
than relying on the change of control aspect of the transaction, should have singled
out the deal protection measures in that case as the source of the need for enhanced
judicial scrutiny. Had the court done so, rather than focus on the change of control as
the source of enhanced judicial scrutiny, some degree of "categorical confusion" in
this doctrinal field might have been avoided. See Strine, supra note 28, at 926-31 (dis-
cussing the problems of basing enhanced judicial scrutiny on the change of control
test).
46 Cf Black & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 536 (urging that target directors face "a
strong conflict of interest" in approving any merger, and if such conflicts 'Justify
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that a more coherent set of triggers for application of these doctrinal
approaches may be necessary.
B. Is the Beauty of Revlon Only Skin Deep?
Before revisiting the subject of triggers, however, we should pause
to clarify what we are concerned about triggering. In this regard, ever
since the Delaware Supreme Court's 1986 landmark opinion in Rev-
lon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,47 the law governing di-
rectors' duties in mergers has been fragmented in a respect that paral-
lels the dichotomy described and criticized in the preceding Section.
Revlon has two principal doctrinal offshoots. First, where a company is
to be sold (whatever that means), the directors' duties "change[d]
from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with
getting the best price for the stockholders."41 Second, as explained a
few years later by the Delaware Supreme Court, Revlon also establishes
that the activation of those duties triggers "enhanced judicial scrutiny"
of the sort (and in the framework) that would be applied if the direc-
tors had unilaterally approved some defensive measure.49 The latter
proposition is hardly stunning: after all, in Revlon, every step the de-
fendant directors took occurred in response to repeated, unsolicited
(and, in some respects, genuinely hostile) efforts to acquire control of
50
the company. Moreover, the steps principally at issue in the case
were deal protection measures of enormous, perhaps even "draco-
nian," proportions.' It would have been surprising indeed for the
special scrutiny in sales of control, they justify similar scrutiny in stock-for-stock merg-
ers"). While generally agreeing with the logic of Black and Kraakman's argument, this
Article argues, instead, that the existence of such conflicts is not self-evident, and, es-
pecially in light of the legitimizing influence of uncoerced approval by disinterested
shareholders, not all mergers involving a transfer of control should give rise to special
scrutiny. Black and Kraakman also suggest that special judicial scrutiny is appropriate
at least where the acquirer is substantially larger than the target, such that the acquirer
issues less than twenty percent of its shares in the merger and, thus, offers little pros-
pect of substantial "hidden value." Id. at 544. This choice, however, may be back-
wards. In light of the data indicating that premiums are substantially lower where ac-
quirer shareholders vote on the merger (e.g., where more than twenty percent of the
acquirer's shares are issued), one could argue that target shareholders ought to have
greater, not lesser, protection from (and fiduciary demands upon) their directors
where the acquirer's shareholders vote on the merger.
47 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
48 Id. at 182.
49 See QVC, 637 A.2d at 45 (describing the alteration of directors' duties in the case
where sale of the company was inevitable); id. at 184 (same).
50 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177-79.
51 Id. at 180.
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court, so soon after its decision in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,2
to have applied any standard of review to the Revlon directors' actions
other than enhanced scrutiny.'
53
The more inscrutable offspring of Revlon-and the source of un-
necessary doctrinal schism-is its ostensible reconfiguration of direc-
tor duties in the context of a "sale" of the company. 4 Apart from the
difficulties and confusion surrounding what a "sale" is and when that
reconfiguration of duties occurs,55 is the even subtler question of what
that reconfiguration actually means when it does occur. This question
needs to be answered as part of any exercise in understanding the
framework of fiduciary duties applicable to cash acquisitions, as op-
posed to stock-for-stock mergers. The thesis that follows in this Sec-
tion is that Revlon's ostensible reconfiguration of director duties in
certain mergers is only skin deep and should not be allowed either to
overstate the responsibilities of directors and the courts in change of
control transactions, or to obscure or minimize their roles in ordinary
56stock-for-stock mergers.
As previously noted, we know from Revlon and QVC that, in a
change of control transaction, the directors have a duty to obtain for
the shareholders the highest value reasonably available.57  But does
this concept have any specific content? At the most basic level the
concept borders on the vacuous: it merely holds that, in choosing be-
tween competing cash bids, directors must choose the higher bid, all
52 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
53 Id. at 955 (stating that the power of the directors to protect their corporation is
limited, and "[a] corporation does not have unbridled discretion to defeat any per-
ceived threat by any Draconian means available").
54 See Revlon, 506 A.2d 173, 182.
55 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, What Triggers Revlon ?, 25 WAKE
FoREST L. REv. 37, 38 (1990) ("Revlon ties management's obligations during a takeover
attempt to a discrete event-the point at which a sale of the company becomes inevita-
ble-that is both ambiguous and commonplace, since its occurrence may be difficult
to pinpoint in a hostile takeover, and, yet, it must arise in every friendly acquisition."
(footnote omitted)).
56 Moreover, to the extent that Revlon duties lose their talismanic significance, it
may, and should, become less important to spend doctrinal effort worrying about
when those duties arise. But see Allen et al., supra note 31, at 1321 n.130 (emphasizing
the continued importance of determining when Revlon duties apply).
57 See text accompanying notes 22, 48; see also Leo E. Strine,Jr., The Social Responsi-
bility of Boards of Directors and Stockholders in Change of Control Transactions: Is There Any
"There" There?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1175-76 (2002) ("[T]he board is charged with
getting the highest immediate 'alue in the deal... [where] the board's singular focus
is on getting the best price for the current stockholders, regardless of the interests of
other constituencies.").
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other things being equal. 5s That proposition seems unassailable. As
Black and Kraakman have pointed out, however, things never are
equal: directors' duties in evaluating competing bids should not pre-
vent them, even where the competing bids are in cash, from looking
beyond nominal offered values and considering other factors, like fi-
nancial and regulatory risks.59 All that QVC requires, even when apply-
ing Revlon, is that the directors try to "achieve an objective comparison
of the alternatives"6 by analyzing each bid "on its value as of the date
it will be received by the stockholders., 6' Even in this comparison of
value, however, the court acknowledged that there was room for di-
rector judgment and discretion in evaluating competing bids permit-
ting them to take into account strategic considerations beyond nomi-
nal price.62 Presumably, judicial flexibility even permits directors to
take into account potential effects on nonshareholder constituencies,
at least to the extent that such effects potentially influence the value
of the bids under consideration and are, therefore, "rationally related
[to] benefits accruing to the stockholders." 63
Does the law really require any less of directors faced with compet-
ing stock bids, neither of which would involve a change of control? In
that situation, does the law allow the directors to accept a bid that the
directors believe to involve (or offer) substantially less value at the
time? One suspects not. Any other view of the law would be hard, in-
deed, to reconcile with the consensus (extensively debated, to be
sure) that the function of the corporation, and those who manage it,
is to enhance corporate profit and shareholder gain.64 One suspects,
rather, that, in such a case, the directors would merely claim that their
58 Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del.
1994) (holding that although the board of directors needs to look at a variety of fac-
tors, the board still has one "primary objective-to secure the transaction offering the
best value reasonably available for the stockholder").
59 See Black & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 539 (discussing the type of discretion a
board should retain in determining maximum value).
60 QVC, 637 A.2d at 44.
61 Id. at 44 n.14.
62 Id. at 44.
63 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
64 See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (a) (1994) ("[A] corporation should have as its objective the
conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and share-
holder gain."); E. Norman Veasey, Should Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good
Corporate Governance Practices-Or Vice Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 2179, 2184 (2001)
("Our jurisprudence is full of the rubric that directors should act in the honest belief
that the action taken is in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.").
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judgments about long-range, intangible prospects for success (includ-
ing how effects on other constituencies are likely to translate into
shareholder value) are entitled to greater weight than identification of
which bidder is prepared to pay a greater sum in cash.
Perhaps, one might argue, the significance of Revlon and QVC lies
in some obligation on the part of directors to explore alternatives
more thoroughly when a proposed merger involves a change of con-
trol. If a heightened duty to explore alternatives is, indeed, part of a
director's Revlon duties, it too has relatively little specific content as a
65rule. Certainly nothing in Revlon requires that directors negotiate
with more than one bidder, conduct an active bidding contest, or
66even conduct an explicit market check. Thus, despite considerable
fixation by the legal community upon Revlon as a separate doctrinal
fount, the Delaware Supreme Court itself appropriately described Rev-
lon as "merely one of an unbroken line of cases that seek to prevent
the conflicts of interest that arise in the field of mergers and acquisi-
tions by demanding that directors act with scrupulous concern for
fairness to shareholders." 67
Clearly, the real significance of Revlon, QVC, and related Delaware
case law is not in reconfiguring the directors' duties, but in determin-
ing how the courts should assess the directors' decision that the deal
they have approved satisfies the legal mandate to enhance share-
holder value. This, of course, is a question of standards ofjudicial re-
view, and not substantive director duties. Indeed, perhaps all that Rev-
lon and QVC mean is that in change of control mergers, the courts
should be less inclined to accept claims that directors chose one bid as
superior when a competing bid appeared to have a higher current
market value.68 This more limited view of Revlon and QVC returns us
to the questions of whether a change of control should simply be a bi-
nary on-off switch for triggering such enhanced judicial scrutiny, and
65 See Allen et al., supra note 31, at 1321 ("[T]he Revlon standard differs little from
the Unocalstandard in practical application.").
M. See Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989) ("When... the
directors possess a body of reliable evidence with which to evaluate the fairness of a
transaction, they may approve that transaction without conducting an active survey of
the market.").
67 Id. at 1286.
68 This disinclination is what Black and Kraakman urge as a lower judicial toler-
ance for claims of "hidden value." See Black & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 539-40 (ar-
guing that judicial deference to directors should lessen as the "importance of hidden
value ... shrinks").
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whether there are more useful alternative approaches for determining
when such scrutiny is warranted.
C. An Alternative Doctrinal Approach to Judicial Evaluation of Target Firm
Director Conduct in Mergers
The analytical framework suggested in this Section is not an at-
tempt to reinvent Delaware corporate law concerning standards of ju-
dicial review of director action in the context of mergers. In fact,
to some extent, what follows is simply a reminder of two important
and salutary aspects of Delaware merger doctrine. Both are well-
established and should remain so in order to protect shareholder in-
terests against unilateral action by directors or controlling sharehold-
ers. Beyond that, this Section merely suggests a third basis for en-
hanced judicial review-a focus on shareholder voting rights-that is
amply supported, and perhaps now fully clarified, in Delaware case
law.
First, conflicts of interest on the part of a majority of the directors
and a controlling shareholder will subject a merger to the most strin-
gent form of judicial review-in which the proponents of the transac-
tion must establish its "entire fairness" as a matter of both price and
procedure. This is true regardless of whether the merger is a cash-
out merger or one in which the minority shareholders receive stock of
the parent company. After all, the leading Delaware case that estab-
lished the principle of "entire fairness" review in controlled mergers
over fifty years ago was a stock-for-stock transaction in which control
did not shift.70 Whether, in such mergers, uncoerced, disinterested
shareholder approval alone should eliminate enhanced judicial scru-
tiny altogether is a matter of continuing debate. Some corporate law
scholars urge that it should 7' and that shareholder approval shifts the
72burden of proof to those challenging the merger.
69 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) ("[W]here one
stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fair-
ness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.").
70 Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 109-10 (Del. 1952); see also
Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277, 287 (Del. 2003) (remanding for possible application
of "entire fairness" review to a stock-for-stock merger approved by a potentially con-
flicted majority of directors, but not involving a change of control).
See Allen et al., supra note 31, at 1308-09 (noting that the argument that even
fully informed, disinterested shareholder approval may be coerced is unsubstantiated
and, therefore, does notjustify enhanced scrutiny).
72 See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Communications Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del.
1994) (shifting the burden to the challenging shareholder to prove unfairness if the
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Second, and similarly, director actions approving unsolicited
takeover bids have elicited some degree of enhanced judicial scrutiny,
at least since Unocal was decided in 1985. In fact, the whole concept
of enhanced scrutiny or intermediate levels ofjudicial review of merg-
ers arose in cases in which directors entered into merger agreements
in response to hostile bids. Moreover, application of such judicial
scrutiny occurred regardless of whether the merger in question was a
cash merger or a stock-for-stock merger in which control did not
change. 4
The third proposition of Delaware law relevant to determining the
duty of directors in approving a merger rests on the recognition that
in the field of mergers, unlike most other business decisions, by stat-
ute directors must share corporate power with shareholders.75 While
the shareholders cannot unilaterally initiate or approve mergers, their
vote is necessary to effectuate the transaction. 6 The right of share-
holders to vote on a merger is an important one, as the empirical data
reviewed earlier illustrate. 7' Accordingly, Delaware case law has, at
least ostensibly, sought to protect that right against impairment by
781
unilateral director action.
transaction is approved by an informed majority of minority shareholders).
73 See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151-55
(Del. 1990) (applying the Unocal standard to Time's response to Paramount's hostile
tender offer); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1988)
(noting that where a self-interested director makes a manipulative and deceptive busi-
ness decision, the resulting transaction is subject to entire fairness judicial review);
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182-84 (Del. 1985)
(evaluating the directors' approval of a merger with a "white knight" under Unocal
standards).
74 See, e.g., In re Holly Farms Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 10350, 1988 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 164, at *12 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988) (reviewing an application to enjoin con-
summation of a stock-for-stock merger in which control would not pass and holding
that, "[b]ecause this sale came in response to, and as an alternative to, Tyson Foods'
$52 cash tender offer, I agree that the Board's actions must be judged under the stan-
dards articulated in Revlon").
75 DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 251 (c) (2001).
76 Id.
77 Supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
78 See, e.g., MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003) ("The
[clourts of this [s]tate will not allow the wrongful subversion of corporate democracy
by manipulation of the corporate machinery or by machinations under the cloak of
Delaware law." (quoting Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 239 (Del. 1982)));
Frederick H. Alexander, Reining in Good Intentions: Common Law Protections of Voting
Rights, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 897, 902-03 (2001) (noting that protecting the integrity of
stockholders' voting rights guards against draconian deals).
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Thus, this Article argues that Delaware law should apply propor-
79
tionality standards of review, as developed in Unocal and its progeny,
where director action in connection with a merger materially impairs
the ability of shareholders to exercise their right to vote on a pro-
posed merger. In fact, this proposition-that voting impairment
should trigger enhanced scrutiny-may already be the law. Even be-
fore the recent decision in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., this
proposition was regularly applied by the Delaware Chancery Court.s°
In addition, the Delaware Supreme Court has previously recognized
that Unocal review stems from a desire to check director action that
disenfranchises shareholders. 8' For instance, in its 1995 In re Santa Fe
Pacific Corp. Shareholders Litigation2 opinion, the Delaware Supreme
Court articulated why voting impairment should trigger enhanced
scrutiny. "Board action which coerces stockholders to accede to a
transaction to which they otherwise would not agree is problem-
atic.... Thus, enhanced judicial scrutiny of Board action is designed
to assure that stockholders vote ... in an atmosphere free from undue
coercion.,
83
In the recent Omnicare decision, the Delaware Supreme Court ex-
panded upon this point, stating:
79 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (requir-
ing directors to reasonably believe that there is a "danger to corporate policy and ef-
fectiveness" and that any defensive measure taken is "reasonable in relation to the
threat posed").
80 See, e.g., In re NCS Healthcare, Inc. S'holders Litig., 825 A.2d 240, 261-63 (Del.
Ch. 2002) (upholding director action under the Unocal standard of reasonableness
where there had been a shareholder vote), rev'd sub nom Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS
Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003); Ace Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95,
108 (Del. Ch. 1999) ("[A] no-escape merger agreement that locks up the necessary
votes [may constitute] an unreasonable preclusive and defensive obstacle within the
meaning of UnocaL"); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., Nos. 17398,
17383, 17427, 1999 WL 1054255, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999) (noting but not decid-
ing a claim that the termination fee probably violated Unocal standards); see also Strine,
supra note 28, at 942 (concluding that judicial emphasis on stockholder choice in-
cludes deference to directors' proposals).
81 See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1379 (Del. 1995) (discussing
how Unocal review is intended to protect shareholders' franchise, and thus, corporate
democracy).
82 In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S'holders Litig., 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995).
83 Id. at 68. Conversely, the court has recognized-and should extend this recog-
nition to all mergers in which disinterested shareholders hold controlling veto
power-that the Unocal form of judicial review is limited to director action that is uni-
lateral and not dependent upon concurrent, or subsequent, shareholder approval. See
Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1377 (Del. 1996) ("A Unocal analysis should be used
only when a board unilaterally... adopts defensive measures in reaction to a perceived
threat." (emphasis added)).
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The Delaware corporation statute provides that the board's management
decision to enter into and recommend a merger transaction can become
final only when ownership action is taken by a vote of the stockholders.
Thus, the Delaware corporation law expressly provides for a balance of
power between boards and stockholders which makes merger transac-
tions a shared enterprise and ownership decision. Consequently, a
board of directors' decision to adopt defensive devices to protect a
merger agreement may implicate the stockholders' right to effectively
vote contrary to the initial recommendation of the board in favor of the
84transaction.
In this respect, Omnicare was absolutely consistent with the argu-
ments made in this Section. In determining whether to apply en-
hanced scrutiny, however, passage of control in the merger should
make no difference at all. In Omnicare, the court determined that deal
protection measures triggered enhanced scrutiny, despite its assump-
tion that the business judgment rule applied to the directors' decision
to approve the merger itself.8 5 Thus, the court's reaffirmation of the
816distinction between control-shifting mergers and other mergers was
mere dictum. If shareholder approval is unimpaired by the unilateral
director approval of deal protection devices, there should be no occa-
sion for enhanced judicial scrutiny, even if the merger is one in which
84 Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 930. In Omnicare, the Delaware Supreme Court identified
improper director motivation as a basis for enhanced scrutiny of deal protection
measures that impaired shareholder voting fights. Id. The court held that "conflicts of
interest arise when a board of directors acts to prevent stockholders from effectively
exercising their right to vote contrary to the will of the board." Id. Reiterating this
conflict of interest theme, the court further pronounced that "[t]here are inherent
conflicts between a board's interest in protecting a merger transaction it has approved,
the stockholders' statutory right to make the final decision to either approve or not
approve a merger, and the board's continuing responsibility to effectively exercise its
fiduciary duties at all times after the merger agreement is executed." Id. These allu-
sions to improper director motivation may be unfortunate. Though the court could
have comfortably insisted upon enhanced scrutiny based solely on the perceived im-
pairment of shareholder voting rights, as urged above, the arguably unnecessary invo-
cation of improper director motivation may have contributed to a dissenting justice's
concern that the majority opinion inappropriately "shamed" the defendant directors.
Id. at 948 (Steele, J., dissenting). Enhanced scrutiny should not inherently depend
upon an assumed or identified improper director motivation, particularly if such an
assumption called into question the application of exculpatory charter provisions un-
der statutes like section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001) (limiting the personal liability of directors for
breach of fiduciary duty as directors). See infra note 94 and accompanying text for a
discussion regarding director liability and judicial scrutiny.
85 Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 929.
86 Id.
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control changes."' Conversely, even if the transaction is a stock-for-
stock merger without a change of control, unilateral director action
that significantly impairs the shareholders' ability to effectively exer-
cise their power to vote on the merger should be evaluated under
Unocal/Unitrin proportionality standards. This is because the share-
holder interests at stake appear, in light of the previously reviewed
data,"" to be as financially significant as they are in change of control
mergers.
This equivalence of doctrinal treatment does not ignore the sig-
nificance of change of control. When engaging in proportionality re-
view, a court could consider that the challenged merger involves a
change of control-a significant fact that could call for a higher level
of justification than might otherwise be required. The Unocal/Unitrin
test is certainly flexible enough to accommodate such concerns, and
accordingly, change of control need not require the construction and
application of independent systems of doctrinal review.
What constitutes significant impairment of shareholder voting
rights, for purposes of the proposed (or already extant) test, is of
course a debatable question that, in all likelihood, will evolve with ex-
perience. For now, certain deal protection measures-two to three
percent breakup fees or no-shop clauses with fiduciary outs, for ex-
ample-are widely viewed as so prevalent and minimally intrusive
upon shareholder voting rights that they may be insufficient, standing
alone, to warrant enhanced judicial scrutiny. 9 On the other hand,
87 This approach, thus, elevates the significance of the shareholder franchise
above other considerations in determining the standard of review by which courts are
to assess the validity of deal protection devices. For this reason, this approach is some-
what different in emphasis than the useful and flexible catalogue of considerations
identified in Gregory V. Varallo & Srinivas M. Raju, A Fresh Look at Deal Protection De-
vices: Out from the Shadow of the Omnipresent Specter, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 975 (2001).
88 See text accompanying notes 18-19 (presenting empirical observations about the
effect of voting rights on merger premium).
See, e.g., McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 498, 505 (Del. Ch. 2000)
(describing a 3.5% termination fee as "still within the range that is generally consid-
ered reasonable"); Matador Capital Mgmt. Corp. v. BRC Holdings, Inc., 729 A.2d 280,
291 (Del. Ch. 1998) (finding that defensive measures including a no-shop provision
and a termination fee do not trigger enhanced judicial scrutiny because they do not
prevent a third party from making a bona fide offer at a higher price); In re Vitalink
Communications Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 12085, 991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 195, at *19-20
(Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 1991) (declaring that a termination fee valued at approximately 1.9%
of the total value of the transaction was not significant enough to prevent a full canvass
of the market); Gregory V. Varallo & Srinivas M. Raju, A Process Based Model for Analyz-
ing Deal Protection Measures, 55 Bus. LAw. 1609, 1613 n.9 (2000) (citing cases in which
breakup or termination fees ranging from 3-3.5% of transaction value were held to be
reasonable and valid). Similarly, courts sometimes acknowledge conflicts of interest
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highly unusual and intrusive deal protection measures-such as crown
jewel asset options at strike prices substantially below asset value or
no-shop provisions that extend for a substantial time after termina-
tion-clearly call for proportionality review. 90 In the middle of this
spectrum, enhanced judicial scrutiny should not unduly trouble direc-
tors (or their counsel) who negotiate and plan merger transactions in
good faith, since proportionality review is not without considerable
deference (some might say too much deference) to director deci-
sions." Moreover, enhanced judicial scrutiny, activated solely by an
intrusion upon the voting rights of shareholders and not otherwise
complicated by conflicts of director interest or bad faith, should not
result in any individual director liability, given the almost universal
adoption of exculpatory charter provisions.2
There are several significant virtues of this suggested approach to
selecting the appropriate mode ofjudicial review. First, it flows from,
and applies to, director action-action impairing shareholder veto
on the part of directors, but find them insufficiently significant to warrant the more
stringent "entire fairness" review that such conflicts would otherwise engender. See,
e.g., Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.. 663 A.2d 1156, 1170 (Del. 1995) (agreeing
with the-court of chancery that the "alleged hope of better employment opportunities"
was insufficient to create a material conflict of interest); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
leum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958-59 (Del. 1985) (holding that no disqualifying self-interest
was apparent when the corporation's self-tender would harm a stockholder bidder,
while modestly benefiting all other stockholders, including directors).
90 See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 375 (6th Cir. 1981)
(finding that the crown jewel asset option granted to a bidder significantly dampened
the interest of other potential bidders in the tender offer market and therefore was an
unlawful, manipulative act in connection with a tender offer); Paramount Communi-
cations Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 49-50 (Del. 1994) (classifying a stock
option agreement with note payment and put features valued at $500 million as dra-
conian); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 178 (Del.
1986) (invalidating an asset option at a strike price that was $100-$175 million below
the value ascribed to the assets by the company's investment bank); First Union Corp.
v. Suntrust Banks, Inc., No. 01-CVS-4486, 2001 WL 1885686, at *38 (N.C. Super. Aug.
10, 2001) (invalidating a nontermination clause extending five months after a share-
holder vote as "an actionably coercive condition impeding the free exercise of the Wa-
chovia shareholder's right to vote on the merger").
91 See Strine, supra note 28, at 942 (describing the "deference to directors" appar-
ent when, in the course of a merger, courts allow directors to give preferred partners
advantages over subsequent bidders).
92 See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1094-95 (Del. 2001) (finding that, ab-
sent "a loyalty violation or other violation falling within the exceptions to the [slection
102(b) (7) exculpation provision," a director is not liable for his conduct in approving
a merger); see also Alexander, supra note 78, at 906-07 (proposing a "vote coercion
analysis" that operates independently of fiduciary considerations and allows for evalua-
tion and invalidation of inappropriately coercive deal protection measures, without
regard to director motivation or conduct).
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power--that increases shareholders' vulnerability to increased agency
costs. This vulnerability is a core basis for judicial enforcement of fi-
duciary duties.93 It is entirely fitting, therefore, that as shareholders'
ability to protect themselves from director action is diminished by the
directors' own conduct, judicial review of such conduct becomes more
active. Second, the objective reference to impairment of the share-
holder franchise obviates difficult problems of proof in regard to as-S 94
sessing the subjective motivations of directors. Finally, it operates
regardless of whether the transaction involves a change of control,
and is applicable both to acquiring firm and target firm directors,
since its focus is on the importance of the right to vote on a merger,
regardless of whether that right belongs to the acquiring or target
firm shareholders.
D. Reassessing Standards of Conduct ofAcquiring Firm Directors
In the not too distant past, and perhaps even continuing today,
the words "serial acquirer" have been the financial equivalent of "se-
rial killer" in terms of the opprobrium they have connoted.9 5 In re-
cent corporate scandals, the culprits seem to have come more from
the ranks of growth-oriented acquirers than from entrenched manag-
ers seeking to retain corporate independence in the face of hostile
bids. Although WorldCom, Global Crossing, and Tyco have given new
life to concerns about acquirer hubris and empire building at .the ex-
pense of the acquirer's shareholders, these concerns are hardly new.96
Such concerns are continually inflamed by reports that merger bene-
fits to acquiring firm shareholders are skimpy or even negative, while
93 See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L.
REv. 1399, 1404 (2002) (noting that "the beneficiary's vulnerability emanates from an
inability to protect against opportunism by the fiduciary"); Eric Talley, Taking the "I"
Out of "Team": Intra-Firm Monitoring and the Content of Fiduciary Duties, 24 J. CORP. L.
1001, 1003 (1999) (pointing out that one of the main purposes of fiduciary law is to
deter intrafirm opportunism).
94 See Black & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 565 (questioning the utility of a stan-
dard of review focusing on the directors' "primary purpose," rather than on "the effect
of the board's actions").
95 See, e.g., Dave Beal & Fred Zimmerman, Merger Mess, DAILY DEAL, Aug. 21, 2002,
available at http://www.thedeal.com; There's No Magic in Mergers, BUS. WK., Oct. 14,
2002, at 178 [hereinafter No Magic] (discussing the destruction of shareholder wealth
caused by the "gigantic wave of mergers and acquisitions" during the 1990s).
96 See supra notes 4, 13 (noting that negative postmerger returns are often received
by the acquiring firms' shareholders).
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such benefits disproportionately accrue to target firm shareholders. 
9 7
The inevitable questions, therefore, are whether the applicable legal
structure overprotects the interests of target firm shareholders while
underprotecting the interests of acquiring firm shareholders, and
whether the standards ofjudicial review of the conduct of the acquir-
ing firm's directors should be adjusted.9'
There is surely something anomalous in the way that corporate
law deals with the duties of acquiring firm directors relative to those of
the target firm. Fiduciary duties presumably respond to and address,
at least in part, concerns over vulnerability to agency costs. Therefore,
one might expect those duties to be most aggressively defined and en-
forced where concerns over such vulnerability are the greatest.0 It is
not clear, however, that in stock-for-stock mergers, or even in mergers
generally, target firm shareholders are more vulnerable to director
misbehavior than acquiring firm shareholders.
Most significant in this comparative assessment is the statutory
treatment of target shareholders relative to acquirer shareholders in
the allocation of voting and appraisal rights. Target firm shareholders
are invariably entitled under state law to vote on mergers,1°° a fact that
ought to provide a highly meaningful, even if imperfect, check on
director misbehavior on the target side. Delaware law provides even
greater protection, in the form of appraisal rights, for target share-
holders where the merger consideration includes cash.' 1 Acquiring
firm shareholders, in contrast, rarely, if ever, have such rights under
state law. Even when the acquirer issues a huge percentage of
its shares in the merger, state law generally vests the decisive voting
power over the transaction in the hands of the board of directors
alone.102 It is only by virtue of stock exchange rules that large stock
97 [T]he vast majority of investors suffered dearly for the sin of investing in com-
panies that had merger fever....
The only real winners were shareholders of target companies who sold their
stock within the first week of the takeover....
... [Acquirers] overestimated the gains of the cost-cutting and synergies the merg-
ers would bring.
No Magic, supra note 95; see also Andrade et al., supra note 1, at 112 (comparing the an-
nouncement-period abnormal returns for target and acquirer firms).
For a relatively early effort to deal with this balance, see Coffee, supra note 13.
99 See sources cited, supra note 93 (discussing the inability of vulnerable parties to
protect themselves from fiduciary opportunism).
100 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 11.04 (Supp. 2002).
101 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (2) (2001).
102 Even where the acquirer issues more than twenty percent of its shares in a
merger, the transaction is commonly structured as a triangular or reverse triangular
2003]
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issuances in connection with mergers come to require acquirer share-
holder approval.'
0 3
The judicial treatment of fiduciary duties is itself somewhat asym-
metrical. The courts are quite willing, perhaps appropriately, to dis-
cern an "omnipresent specter" of self-interest when directors take ac-
tion that tends to protect their corporate positions from threats to
their continued control, and to derive from that "specter" a greater
judicial willingness to inquire into the directors' conduct. 0 4 It is not
preposterous, at least, to identify a similar "specter" as a motivation for
acquiring firm managers whose positions, and perhaps compensation,
will be substantially enhanced postmerger, and to reject such a "spec-
ter" with respect to target directors, whose approval of a merger will
result, not in the preservation, but in the loss of their positions.
10 5
merger with an acquisition subsidiary of the acquirer, thereby avoiding any state law
voting requirement for the acquirer's shareholders. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG,
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1099
(8th ed. 2000) (explaining how conventional triangular mergers operate). The Cali-
fornia corporate statutes provide a rare exception to this voting rights structure requir-
ing a vote of shareholders of the acquiring firm "whose equity securities are issued,
transferred, or exchanged in the reorganization." CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1200(e),
1201 (a) (West 2003).
103 See, e.g., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE (NYSE) LISTED COMPANY MANUAL
§ 312.03(c), available at http://wvw.nyse.com (requiring shareholder approval prior to
the issuance of twenty percent or more of the voting power of the stock).
104 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (recog-
nizing that, because a board may act in its own self-interest, there is a duty of judicial
examination before the protections of the business judgement rule are granted).
Whether the courts have adequately used such willingness is a source of continuing
debate. See, e.g., RonaldJ. Gilson, Unocal Fifeen Years Later (and What We Can Do About
It, 26 DEL.J. CORP. L. 491, 491 (2001) (discussing the evolution of Unocal into an "in-
explicable preference that control contests be resolved through elections rather than
through market transactions"); Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Dead-
hand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOzO L.
REV. 511, 525 (1997) (noting the increased judicial deference given to board decisions
in Unitrin, as compared to that granted in Unocal) ; Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills,
Polls and Professors: A Reply To Professor Gilson, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 1 (2002) (defend-
ing the choices made by Delaware courts since Unocal was decided); Paul L. Regan,
What's Left of Unocal ?, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 947, 947 (2001) (arguing that the Delaware
Supreme Court's use of "substantive coercion" has weakened shareholder power and
reduced the level of Unocal review).
105 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 78, at 901 n.15 (describing a "typical merger" as
one in which "few, if any, of the directors of the target will have continuing positions
with the merged company"); John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hier-
archy: How Contestable Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 858-59 (1999)
(pointing out that even in friendly mergers, most directors of the target company will
lose control of the organization); see also Black & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 536 (pos-
iting without explication that target directors who "will likely lose their positions ...
face a strong conflict of interest"). While severance benefits might well induce such
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These considerations suggest that, in a friendly stock-for-stock
merger, the acquirer's directors' decisions should be at least as, if not
more, suspect and deserving ofjudicial inquiry as the decisions of the
target directors.0 6 Yet, it is target firm directors who are overwhelm-
ingly the object of shareholder litigation, premised on a breach of fi-
duciary duty and an asserted failure to obtain otherwise available value
for the shareholders. 7 By contrast, the acquirer's directors are rarely
the focus of shareholder litigation that claims the acquiring firm is
paying too much.'Os If fear of litigation and liability elicits care at all,
one would expect target firm directors to be far more motivated than
acquiring firm directors to secure financial and legal advisors and to
make decisions that will withstandjudicial review.
directors to favor a merger for personal reasons, it is hard to understand how that mo-
tivation would systematically conflict with the goal of achieving the best deal available,
when the corporation will disappear as a publicly traded firm in any scenario.
106 See William T. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the
Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1067, 1077 n.25 (2002) (asserting that "entity
school advocates should be spending more time ensuring that the stockholders of ac-
quirers have comparable protections under state corporation law (for example, the
right to approve by vote a wider class of acquisitions)").
107 See Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1037, 1051
n.54 (2002) (arguing that target directors are "frequently overly optimistic" about
friendly acquisitions, but more circumspect about unsolicited takeover bids because of
the fear of litigation-so the judicial suspicion of directors in a hostile deal is mis-
placed).
108 Given the formidable obstacles to establishing a claim of a waste of corporate
assets, it is hardly surprising that this claim has not been advanced often, if ever, to
challenge acquirer director action. See Allen et al., supra note 31, at 1317-18 (noting
that "no Delaware case of which [the authors] are aware has ever held that a properly
ratified transaction constituted waste"). In rare cases, to be sure, acquirer sharehold-
ers do sue for relief against acquisitions. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,
571 A.2d 1140, 1140 (Del. 1989), was one such rare case. In that case, the court re-
jected the claim that Revlon required Time's directors to seek higher value for the
shareholders. Id. at 1142. The doctrinal hook that triggered something more than
cursory judicial review was the fact that the restructured deal with Warner responded
to an unsolicited tender offer by Paramount and, thus, triggered enhanced scrutiny
under Unocal. Id. at 1151-55. It is a relatively disregarded fact that Warner sharehold-
ers also brought suit in connection with the merger with Time, asserting the more
conventional claim of a breach of fiduciary duty by the target (Warner) directors. Id.
at 1142; see also Silverstein v. Warner Communications, Inc., No. 11285, 1991 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 15, at *2-3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 4, 1991) (discussing actions brought on behalf of
former Warner shareholders in the aftermath of the Time merger). Even in the recent
litigation surrounding the HP/Compaq merger, in which the most visible litigation was
initiated by a shareholder of the acquirer, the claims centered on voting manipulation
through vote-buying and nondisclosure, rather than on substantive failures by the di-
rectors to negotiate the best deal. Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 19513, 2002 WL
818091, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2002). Indeed, Hewlett-Packard's directors were not
even named as defendants in the litigation. Id.
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This observation should not be taken as a plea for enhanced judi-
cial scrutiny of the conduct of acquiring firm directors in every acqui-
sition. Extending such scrutiny to every acquisition-including direct
or triangular mergers, asset purchases, or other forms-would do con-
siderable violence to traditional principles of judicial respect for di-
rector action.'Y9 In fact, one could, perhaps more persuasively, suggest
that the corporate law's tolerance (in the form of business judgment
rule deference) of acquiring firm director behavior requires similar
judicial tolerance of target firm director behavior, or at least for a
more circumspect application of principles of enhanced judicial scru-
tiny.
109 Business judgment rule deference to the actions of acquiring firm directors,
operating within their sphere of statutory authority, has accounted for judicial ap-
proval of acquisitions seen as imprudent, if not outrageous, by financial and academic
commentators. For example, in Time-Warner, in which then Chancellor Allen, with lu-
cidity impressive even by his own lofty standards, explained:
Reasonable persons can and do disagree as to whether it is the better course
from the shareholders' point of view collectively to cash out their stake in the
company now at this (or a higher) premium cash price [offered by Para-
mount]. However, there is no persuasive evidence that the board of Time has
a corrupt or venal motivation in electing to continue with its long-term plan
even in the face of the cost that that course will no doubt entail for the com-
pany's shareholders in the short run. In doing so, it is exercising perfectly
conventional powers to cause the corporation to buy assets for use in its busi-
ness. Because of the timing involved, the board has no need here to rely
upon a self-created power designed to assure a veto on all changes in control.
The value of a shareholder's investment, over time, rises or falls chiefly be-
cause of the skill, judgment and perhaps luck-for it is present in all human
affairs-of the management and directors of the enterprise. When they exer-
cise sound or brilliant judgment, shareholders are likely to profit; when they
fail to do so, share values likely will fail to appreciate. In either event, the fi-
nancial vitality of the corporation and the value of the company's shares is in
the hands of the directors and managers of the firm. The corporation law
does not operate on the theory that directors, in exercising their powers to
manage the firm, are obligated to follow the wishes of a majority of shares. In
fact, directors, not shareholders, are charged with the duty to manage the
firm.
In the decision they have reached here, the Time board may be proven in
time to have been brilliantly prescient or dismayingly wrong. In this decision,
as in other decisions affecting the financial value of their investment, the
shareholders will bear the effects for good or ill. That many, presumably
most, shareholders would prefer the board to do otherwise than it has done
does not, in the circumstances of a challenge to this type of transaction, in my
opinion, afford a basis to interfere with the effectuation of the board's busi-
ness judgment.
Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., Nos. 10866, 10670, & 10935, 1989 WL
79880, at *30 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), affd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) (citations omit-
ted).
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Alternatively, the evident, and not readily justifiable, disparity be-
tween the treatment in mergers of acquiring firm shareholders and
target firm shareholders invites alteration of the statutory voting
framework governing mergers. The drafters of the Model Business
Corporation Act have already taken a step in this direction, by follow-
ing the stock exchange rules, and revising the model statute to pro-
vide for a shareholder vote whenever more than twenty percent of the
corporation's stock is to be issued (in a merger or otherwise). o Even
this requirement, however, has a less demanding constraint than
most, if not all, state merger statutes (which require approval by at
least a majority of the outstanding shares entitled to vote-as opposed
to the "more yes votes than no votes" standard now embraced in the
Model Act)."' Moreover, nothing in the Model Act even begins to
impose an acquiring firm shareholder vote requirement with respect
to an acquisition not involving the issuance of stock. Given the evi-
dent imbalance in the aggregate benefits of mergers and acquisitions,
perhaps this statutory imbalance merits reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
The scope and purpose of this Article are thus quite modest. Pre-
liminary data suggest that premiums in cash mergers and stock-for-
stock mergers do not differ substantially, but that the voting right of
shareholders (at least acquiring firm shareholders) in a merger has
significant value. The rough equivalence of premiums reinforces
doubts about the utility of change of control as a touchstone for
determining the appropriate level of judicial review of director action
in the merger context. The financial significance of shareholder
voting rights both reaffirms the desirability of judicial protection of
such rights and suggests that substantial impairment of such rights
by unilateral director action should occasion enhanced judicial scru-
tiny. Finally, because there is typically much less legal protection in
mergers for shareholders of acquiring firms than for those of target
firms-and because the evidence indicates that such mergers dispro-
portionately benefit target shareholders-renewed thought should be
110 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.21 (f) (1) (ii) (1999); see also American Bar Associa-
tion Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-Fun-
damental Changes, 54 BUS. LAW. 685, 712 (1999) (including official comments elaborat-
ingon § 6.21(0).
Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 110, at 713; cf., DEL. CODE ANN., tit.
8, § 251(c) (2001) (requiring target shareholder approval by at least a majority of the
outstanding shares entitled to vote).
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devoted to whether, and how, the law could more evenly and consis-
tently evaluate the conduct of acquirer and target directors. If the
only aspect of state corporate law that distinguishes acquirers and tar-
gets in stock-for-stock mergers is that the target's shareholders vote on
the deal and the acquirer's shareholders do not, perhaps the courts'
only choice or obligation is to protect such voting rights where they
are afforded, but otherwise treat both sets of directors identically.
PREMIUMS IN STOCK-FOR-STOCK MERGERS
APPENDIX A
The tables below are calculations based upon information derived
from public announcements and SEC filings in connection with
mergers announced in the years 1999 through 2002. The sample in-
cluded 81 mergers in which the consideration was entirely cash and 97
mergers in which the consideration was entirely stock of the acquiring
corporation.
Table 1: Comparison of Premiums in Cash
and Stock Mergers
Table 1 compares the mean and median premiums in cash versus
stock-for-stock mergers. The table also reflects the standard deviations
(which are relatively large in relation to the means, indicating a broad
dispersion of premiums in both cash and stock-for-stock mergers),
and the result of a least-squares regression of the effect of the form of
merger consideration on premium size. On the limited data analyzed,
that result fails to establish any statistically significant effect on mean
or median premium size of the use of cash rather than stock as
merger consideration.
Form of Mean premium Median
consideration (standard premium
deviation) (%)
(%)
Cash (N=81) 35.92 (31.24) 28.07
Stock (N=97) 30.09 (37.97) 28.26
t -1.12
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Table 2: Effects of Selected Variables on Size of Premium
(stockfor-stock mergers only (N=97))
Premium Coefficient T
Voting - 18.65 - 2.04
right
T directors .0212 0.10
Revenueina -11.65 -1.45indicator
= .061
Table 2 reflects the results of a least-squares regression of the ef-
fects on premium size (percentage measured by the announced ex-
change ratio and closing prices of acquirer and target corporation
shares on the day preceding announcement of the transaction) of the
variables (i) "voting rights," i.e. whether acquiring shareholders were
entitled to vote on the proposed merger, either under state corporate
law or stock exchange rules); (ii) "T directors," i.e. the percentage of
directors of the postmerger firm who were directors or officers of the
target; and (iii) "revenue indicator," a variable measured by an indica-
tor equaling 1 if the ratio of acquiring firm revenues to target firm
revenues was 5 or greater, 0 if otherwise. The cut-off ratio of 5 was
found by a grid search on which 5 was the value that maximized the
equation's explanatory power.
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APPENDIX B
Comparative Summary of Recommendations
Topic Black & Kraakman Kahan Hamermesh
Standard of review
dependent on Eliminate... Accepted in general' 3  Eliminate..
change of control
Scope of Revlon Apply to all mergers"0 Apply to change of Eliminate as acontrol mergers'" distinct standard"7
Review of deal Continue trend toward Generally not separately Limit by applying
protection fiduciary duty limits"' addressed" 9  enhanced
measures scrutiny'
Acquirer share- Adopt 2' Not addressed Consider'
holders vote
112 See Black & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 534-36, 538 ("[C]ourts should avoid
second-guessing business decisions, and shareholders who are unhappy with the
board's actions should look to proxy contests rather than the courts to press their
claims.").
"' See Kahan, supra note 29, at 593-99 (analyzing directors' Revlon duties upon sale
of company). But see id. at 597 n.84 (suggesting a more lenient standard of review for
change of control mergers not subject to deal protection measures).
See supra Part III.A (criticizing application of enhanced judicial scrutiny be-
cause of a change of control transaction).
115 See Black & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 543-45 (arguing that stock-for-stock
mergers between a large company and a small one should be reviewed under Revlon).
16 See Kahan, supra note 29, at 597-98 (contending board decisions in a change of
control, which cannot be reversed by shareholders, should undergo heightened scru-
tiny).
See supra Part III.B (arguing that Revlon does not impose substantive duties on
directors that prior cases did not already articulate).
118 See Black & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 546-47 (exploring why case law restricts
use of defensive measures for cash and for equity bids).
119 But see Kahan, supra note 29, at 597 n.84 and note 113 (presenting view that
Unocal standard, and not the Revlon standard, should apply whenever a "board entered
a merger agreement which, if approved, would result in a change of control but which
is notj0rotected by such defensive measures as a poison pill").
See supra Part III.C (proposing that Unocal proportionality standard of review
appl whenever director action "significantly impairs" shareholder voting rights).
Ki See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1953-55 (1996) (recommending, in the context of laws gov-
erning emerging economies, that default rules should include requiring a shareholder
vote on acquisitions of assets, directly or through subsidiaries, of over fifty percent in
book value of the corporation's assets).
122 See supra Part III.D (suggesting that enhanced judicial scrutiny may be neces-
sary to protect acquiring firm's shareholders from directors motivated to engage in
aggressive acquisitions).
* * * * * *
